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Abstract 3 
Purpose: Conditions of inadequate and asymmetric information when an agent is hired by a 4 
principal have resulted in the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (MHAS) in 5 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) construction projects. The objective of this study was to 6 
explore strategies to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection in PPP construction projects. 7 
Design/methodology/approach: Questionnaires were used to elicit responses from 8 
respondents. Mean score ranking was used to rank these strategies while reliability analysis 9 
was conducted using Cronbach Alpha coefficient and level of agreement tested using 10 
Kendall’s concordance. Factor analysis grouped the strategies into eight components.  11 
Findings: From the mean score ranking, Monitoring; Transfer of risks; Screening; Managing 12 
of construction risks; and Increased incentives to control costs were the most significant 13 
strategies. The eight components were: Transparent process and contract; Incentives and 14 
monitoring; Screening and technical assistance; Unbundling and benchmarking; Funding and 15 
small liabilities; Information clarification and signalling; Risk and contract management; and 16 
Cooperation and finance factors. 17 
Practical implications: The findings of this have identified the most significant strategies to 18 
reduce MHAS on PPP construction projects to serve as a guide to PPP practitioners in 19 
reducing MHAS.   20 
Originality/value: The output of this research contributes to the checklist of strategies that 21 
reduce PPP project failures arising from MHAS and contributes to the development of the 22 
agency theory. 23 
Paper Type - Research paper 24 
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construction projects 26 
 27 
 28 
 29 
 30 
INTRODUCTION 31 
Moral hazard is the situation of information unevenness or asymmetry that happens after the 32 
principal takes a decision (Owusu-Manu et al., 2018a). On the other hand, this is called 33 
hidden action because the actions and activities of the agent are not fully exposed to the 34 
principal (Pana, 2010). Correspondingly, within the extant literature, adverse selection is 35 
recognized to be the sole or private information possessed by the contractor and which is not 36 
available to buyer (Biong, 2013). In adverse selection, information gap occurs preceding the 37 
principal making his decision. This phenomenon is also referred to as hidden knowledge. 38 
This is due to the potential agent having information which the principal lacks and thus 39 
leading to the principal making a wrong decision. 40 
The agency problem is a conflict of interest inherited in any relationship where one party is 41 
expected to act in another's best interests (Lobner, 2009; Buvik and Rokkan, 2003). Agency 42 
theory is concerned with resolving problems that exist in agency relationships due to 43 
unaligned goals or different aversion levels to risk. The most common agency relationship in 44 
constructions occurs between principals (clients) and agents (contractors) (Iossa and 45 
Martimort, 2008).  46 
Public-Private-Partnerships date back to the twelfth century (Wettenhall, 2010; Owusu-Manu 47 
et al., 2017). According to Bovaird (2010), in traditional procurement in the public sector, the 48 
government is responsible for settling on design and specifications of the facilities. After the 49 
bidding process, a private sector contractor is paid to construct the project (Ismail, 2013). 50 
Despite controversies about PPP policy in developing countries, many developing countries 51 
actually have huge infrastructure deficit and excessive government debts which in a way has 52 
led to poor economic development and lower standards of living (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 53 
2017a). This serves as an incentive for PPP to be explored in these nations to augment 54 
infrastructure development and boost the living standards of citizens (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 55 
2015; Kumar et al., 2018). Owusu-Manu et al. (2018b) stated that MHAS was one of the 56 
major challenges affecting PPP construction projects in developing countries; and their study 57 
went ahead to explore a number of negative effects of MHAS. McCann et al. (2015) in their 58 
study too established that MHAS was a challenge in Australian PPP projects and PPP 59 
projects’ failure to meet delivery outputs’ minimum requirements.  60 
Like other governments, the Government of Ghana (GoG) has also shown great interest in the 61 
PPP concept, particularly for construction projects (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017b). Since 2004, 62 
few construction PPP projects in Ghana have been initiated with many of the projects failing 63 
to proceed successfully due to a number of reasons including moral hazard and adverse 64 
selection (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017b;  Owusu-Manu et al., 2018b). In Ghana, the Ghana 65 
National Housing Project (GNHP), which was the first ever major PPP housing project to be 66 
initiated in the country’s housing sector failed due to the problems of MHAS (Osei-Kyei et 67 
al., 2019). 68 
There has been theoretical development over the recent years in researching on the problems 69 
of moral hazard and adverse selection. However some gaps do exist in their literature since 70 
there is dearth and scarcity of literature in these areas especially in strategies to reduce 71 
MHAS in PPP construction projects. This study not only extends existing work but also 72 
identifies and ranks significant strategies to reduce MHAS in PPP construction projects. 73 
Practically, the identified and prioritized strategies will serve as a guide and managerial 74 
support in future PPP projects. As such, the findings of the research may guide construction 75 
stakeholders in reducing failure of PPP projects due to MHAS. These stakeholders and 76 
practitioners will improve project success by recognizing and planning against failure of 77 
these PPP projects.   78 
 79 
 80 
LITERATURE REVIEW 81 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 82 
PPP refers to ways of collaboration between public and private stakeholders which purposes 83 
to guarantee the financing, building, refurbishing, administration or preservation of a service 84 
or an infrastructure (Torres and Pina, 2001). Public-Private-Partnerships are carried out in 85 
countless diverse sectors, for example: transportation, residential facilities, metropolitan 86 
development, municipal renaissance, operating institutions of culture, educational areas. 87 
In a study by Budäus and Gründing (1997), Public-Private-Partnership is characterized in a 88 
smaller way by: 89 
 Relations among government and private stakeholders 90 
 Placing emphasis on accomplishment of similar objectives 91 
 Probability of synergy by way of mutual aid 92 
 Orientation of process 93 
 The associate’s distinctiveness and conscientiousness  94 
 Stipulation of cooperation relationship  95 
Due to the extended contract period (around thirty years), it is not feasible to lay down the 96 
exact privileges, risks, rights, expenditures, accomplishments and liabilities in advance 97 
(Budäus, 2006). 98 
Moral hazard and Adverse Selection (MHAS) in PPP construction projects 99 
A moral hazard problem arises when the agent’s action is not verifiable, or when the agent 100 
receives private information after the partnership has been commenced (Owusu-Manu et al., 101 
2018a). Moral hazard should not pose as a challenge or problem if both the principal and 102 
agent had the same objective functions. The misunderstanding about which action should be 103 
taken out is the basis for agency costs (Lobner, 2009).  104 
An adverse selection problem happens when the agent holds private information before the 105 
relationship begins (Owusu-Manu et al., 2018a). The principal will be able to authenticate the 106 
agent’s behavior; however, the optimal decision, the cost of this decision relies on the agent’s 107 
type which is private information to the agent. The principal is aware that the agent is one of 108 
several possible types but he/she cannot identify it (Lobner, 2009).  109 
The two information problems do not exist disjoint, on the whole. This is as a result of the 110 
existence of synergies between stages of the venture, accounting for why different tasks are 111 
bundled in a distinct activity and delegated to a sole responsible private firm. The effort that 112 
the firm exerts at the construction stage influences the circumstances it encounters at the 113 
operation stage. For example, exerting effort might enhance the chance of encountering a 114 
high demand for the service (since the infrastructure is more dependable) or a reduced price 115 
of production (since the cost is an internal attribute of the project). 116 
Impact of MHAS on PPP construction projects 117 
Being a long term and global contract, the partnership contract enhances the traditional issues 118 
of MHAS related to the choice of a bidder. It implies high transaction costs for both the 119 
public and private partners, due to duration of the negotiation and the skills and resources 120 
involved (Allen, 2003). The requirements of the contract are generally complex and 121 
expressed in terms of outputs rather than inputs. MHAS selection in PPPs raise transaction 122 
costs because the government has to negotiate with and monitor the private sector partners 123 
who have their own interests and agendas. 124 
The widespread problem of MHAS in the construction market are the main reason for the 125 
dishonesty of the construction market and is the primary cause of the construction project risk 126 
as well (Akintayo, 2018). If the problem of adverse selection cannot get effective settled, it 127 
will be difficult to form a "win-win" situation in the construction market, which leads to the 128 
harmonious project management being not formed. 129 
The problem of adverse selection is particular prominent in domestic construction market. 130 
Each contractor’s strength level is uneven, which is the fundamental cause of adverse 131 
selection. Because of asymmetric information, the owner has little or false information of the 132 
contractor’s technology, management, credit etc., leading to the owners tend to be at a 133 
disadvantage position in the game of both sides, which leads to adverse selection –that is 134 
"bad money drives out good money" Problems resulting from MHAS in PPP projects are 135 
economic disadvantages for one of the parties, the inefficient use of resources, and the 136 
resulting losses of welfare. 137 
Strategies to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection in PPP construction projects 138 
Transfer of risk by way of enforceable contracts curtails greatly the problems of moral hazard 139 
and adverse selection (Akintayo, 2018). Simply put, transfer of construction risk results in 140 
projects where only the most qualified builders have to control their own construction 141 
liabilities and risks (Blanc-Brude, 2013). Increased incentives to control costs: Selecting 142 
most qualified construction companies coupled with the incentive to manage costs restricts 143 
moral hazard and adverse selection (Blanc-Brude, 2013). A fraction of construction risk 144 
existent in infrastructural projects is a product of who is exposed to the risk (Laffont and 145 
Tirole, 1993). 146 
Managing of construction risks: Construction risks are controlled by way of a network of 147 
contracts (Gatti, 2013) and transferred to construction companies which efficiently make 148 
available insurance against unanticipated construction costs (Owusu-Manu et al., 2018b). 149 
Benchmarking: Asymmetries of information on the operating costs can also be reduced 150 
through benchmarking and market testing processes (yardstick competition) (Kumar et al., 151 
2018). Elementary parts of the service provided by the contractor can be periodically 152 
evaluated against market prices (Bureau and Mougeot, 2007). 153 
Financial unbundling: Financial unbundling is an effective way of ensuring transparency in 154 
projects by inducing a disclosure of the contract financial main points. The commitment of 155 
financial institutions into the contract allows, the assessment of the completion of value for 156 
money and reinforces, and the monitoring upon the special purpose entity (SPE) (Gatti, 157 
2013). 158 
Bond spread: An inadequate risk transfer to the contractor can be discovered by the 159 
reasonability of the bond spread (Ameyaw and Wilhelm, 2017). For instance, if the public 160 
partner takes on almost all the demand risk, it can be, in financial expressions, like providing 161 
to the contractor an advance contract for free (Välilä, 2005). 162 
External finance: External finance brings about a new agency relationship to the contract 163 
(Gatti, 2013). It is positive to the public contractor since the interests of external financiers 164 
are similar to its objective. In this way, part of the monitoring expenses can be externalized 165 
(Blanc-Brude, 2013). Funding competition: At the negotiation period, funding competition 166 
helps to raise the public sector's information on the deal (Ameyaw and Wilhelm, 2017). 167 
However, the cost of gathering this information must not override the savings it brings about. 168 
In this instance, the size of the deal, and the number of bidders, has a crucial role in the trade-169 
off (Singh et al., 2006). 170 
Contain private liabilities to small size: Private liabilities should be contained to an 171 
adequately small size (Blanc-Brude, 2013). PPP projects are to be effectively run and should 172 
not be extremely leveraged (Danau and Vinella, 2014). Securing contract enforcement: To be 173 
able to induce the firm to fulfil the contract, there should be the requirement of investing a 174 
satisfactorily worthy quantity of money in advance, and it should be allowed to recuperate 175 
that investment by the passage of time at the execution stage (Blanc-Brude, 2013). 176 
Contract guarantees and technical assistance: Modern development banks or current 177 
multilateral banks will offer monetary support, assuring guarantees and giving out the most 178 
excellent international actions for project evaluation and risk appraisal, and the best 179 
techniques of innovative finance (Hart, 2003). All these help reduce MHAS in PPP projects. 180 
Screening: Screening refers to the term for all activities whereby the principal attempts to 181 
gain more accurate information on the quality attributes of the agent which are pertinent 182 
(Kumar et al., 2018). These include: references, work probes, certificates, and credit 183 
worthiness (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). Monitoring: Monitoring is essential after a 184 
contract has been signed. The intent of monitoring is to make certain that the agent is acting 185 
in harmony with the contract (Owusu-Manu et al., 2018b). This in the long term decreases 186 
the problems of MHAS in PPP projects (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). 187 
Signaling: The market party which has more information, for example the contractor, signals 188 
its type to the client who is the least informed market stakeholder, using some signals (Kumar 189 
et al., 2018). In case of signaling, the initiative goes out from the better-informed market 190 
participants who send out their signals first and who only then get contracts offered by the 191 
worse informed market party (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). Cooperation among project 192 
participants: Trust takes time to develop between the parties, and it is very fragile, but once 193 
developed it outshines all the other strategies in terms of project control and risk 194 
minimization (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017a). Formal planning and control systems create 195 
more transparency with regard to the actions of the PPP project participants (Danau and 196 
Vinella, 2014). 197 
METHODOLOGY 198 
This study was quantitative in nature and deductive research approach was adopted. 199 
Questionnaires were the main research instrument to collect data. The designed instruments 200 
were pre-tested and piloted before the main survey. As opined by Oppenheim (2000) and 201 
Creswell (2005), pre-testing and piloting surveys are significant in establishing complete 202 
consistency in the data collection (Yin, 2009). Using stratified sampling technique, two 203 
respondents each from government agencies, consultancies and construction firms involved 204 
in PPP projects with insightful expertise and having features of proposed respondents were 205 
asked to pre-test the questionnaires. These six respondents were asked to check the research 206 
instrument (RI) for ambiguity, clearness and time used to finish answering the questionnaires. 207 
They were also to give insights which will improve the preciseness of the questionnaires. 208 
Feedbacks received indicated that the questionnaires were very clear to comprehend and were 209 
very likely to get pertinent answers in the main survey. Comments from the piloting were 210 
used to make a few additions and fine-tuning of the questionnaires for the main survey. The 211 
real survey spanned two months and respondents were asked to rank twenty (20) strategies to 212 
reduce moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects. The Likert scale 5-213 
point grading system was used where 1=not significant; 2=moderately significant; 214 
3=significant; 4=very significant and 5=extremely significant. Mean values greater than 3.00 215 
were significant.  216 
The sampling technique for this study with relation to its design, purpose, and realistic 217 
inference on this research topic is purposive sampling. The researcher chooses what needs to 218 
be identified and undertakes to locate respondents who are willing to release the information 219 
by merit of experience or knowledge (Tongco, 2007). In this research, this strategy involved 220 
identifying the professionals involved in Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) construction 221 
projects. Furthermore, snowball sampling was used in getting the sample size due to the 222 
challenges encountered in evaluating the population size. This strategy is a solution to 223 
reaching hard-to-reach or concealed populations. It exists on the assumption that a link exists 224 
among the original sample and extras in the similar target population (Creswell, 2005). This 225 
mixed sampling process was used to obtain a representative sample size of fifty-six (56) 226 
government agencies, consultancy firms and construction companies in charge of Public 227 
Private Partnership projects. Questionnaires were distributed to five (5) respondents in each 228 
of these companies and agencies resulting in a total of two hundred and eighty (280) 229 
respondents. Two hundred and ten (210) questionnaires representing seventy five percent 230 
(75%) response rate was attained. 231 
Mean score ranking was used to rank these strategies while reliability analysis was conducted 232 
using Cronbach Alpha coefficient. Kendall’s concordance analysis was conducted to measure 233 
the agreement of different respondents on their rankings of strategies. Factor analysis using 234 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) grouped the strategies into eight components. 235 
 236 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 237 
Respondents’ profile 238 
40 percent of respondents work with government agencies in charge of PPP construction 239 
projects. 39 percent of respondents work with consulting firms in charge of PPP construction 240 
projects. Finally, 21 percent of respondents work with construction firms in charge of PPP 241 
construction projects. This research comprises respondents who are working in various 242 
sectors and firms responsible with construction projects and are knowledgeable about the 243 
operations of PPP construction ventures. This therefore lends credence to the reliability of the 244 
study. 245 
Since PPP is quite new in the Ghanaian industry, respondents were not restricted to their 246 
experience in PPP projects but were rather asked their years of working experience. 10.5 247 
percent have less than 5 years’ experience. 28.1 percent have 5-10 years’ experience. 74 248 
respondents representing 35.2 percent have 11-15 years’ experience. 14.3 percent have 16-20 249 
years of working experience while the remaining 11.9 percent have above 20 years of 250 
experience. In conventional work practice and relying on the practical perception of 251 
employment practice in Ghana, having at least six years of working experience qualifies a 252 
worker for the position of senior management. In addition, possessing at least ten years of 253 
working experience makes a worker suitable for the position of senior management. Inferring 254 
from this, it can be deduced that the respondents for this study have adequate working 255 
experience in the industry. In summary, their responses for this study are seen to be reliable 256 
and valid. 257 
10.5 percent of respondents have an HND degree. 47.6 percent have a BSc degree. 258 
Furthermore, 40 percent have an MSc degree while the remaining 1.9 percent have a PhD. 259 
Considering the practical standpoint of the teaching and training courses offered by various 260 
professionals in the Ghanaian industry, it can be seen from this results that the majority have 261 
passed through the tertiary level with the minimum being a BSc degree.  The implication for 262 
this study is that, the respondents have satisfactory background in education and hence have 263 
the propensity to better understand and interpret the variables. Their responses are therefore 264 
anticipated to be credible and consistent. 265 
<Insert Table I here> 266 
 267 
Reliability Statistics 268 
The internal consistency analysis of the responses received shows a Cronbach’s alpha 269 
coefficient value of 0.812. Tavakol and Dennick (2011) postulated that a Cronbach’s alpha 270 
coefficient value between 0.800 and 0.900 is good for a research. This implies that the 271 
internal consistency of the response that was received is strong. Table II presents the analysis 272 
of the reliability statistics of the responses.  273 
<Insert Table II here> 274 
Mean score ranking for strategies to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP 275 
construction projects 276 
Table III shows the results for the mean score ranking. Based on the mean scores, two factors 277 
had means of above 4 and hence were very significant. The top five strategies are stated 278 
below with their standard deviation values. Monitoring was ranked 1st with a mean of 4.06 279 
and standard deviation of 0.891. Transfer of risks was ranked 2nd with a mean of 4.02 and 280 
standard deviation of 0.923. Screening was ranked 3rd with a mean of 3.93 and standard 281 
deviation of 0.813. Managing of construction risks was ranked 4th with a mean of 3.90 and 282 
standard deviation of 0.868. Increased incentives to control costs was ranked 5th with a mean 283 
of 3.87 and standard deviation of 0.745. All the mean values for the factors in the table were 284 
above the population mean (3.0). It is inferred that all these factors are significant as far 285 
strategies to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects is 286 
concerned. 287 
In a study conducted in France by Bureau and Mougeot (2007), benchmarking was ranked as 288 
the most significant factor in reducing MHAS. However in this study, it ranked at a low 289 
position of 18th. Increased incentives to control costs was identified in a stud by Blanc-Brude 290 
(2013) as the most significant indicator for addressing MHAS. In this study, this factor 291 
ranked 5th which was also significant and therefore agrees with the past study undertaken. 292 
<Insert Table III here> 293 
Kendall’s concordance analysis 294 
Kendall’s concordance analysis was conducted to measure the agreement of different 295 
respondents on their rankings of strategies based on mean values within a particular group. If 296 
the Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was statistically significant at a pre-defined 297 
significance level, a reasonable degree of consensus amongst the respondents indicated. 298 
Table IV shows the test results of the Kendall’s concordance analysis for each group of 299 
stakeholders at a significance test value of 0.05. The values of W range from 0 to +1, where a 300 
value further from 0 indicates a strong degree of consistency on the rankings of factors within 301 
each group (Sheskin, 2011). Results suggest that there is consistency on the rankings within 302 
each group: (government agency, consulting firm and construction firm). 303 
<Insert Table IV here> 304 
 305 
FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR STRATEGIES TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD AND 306 
ADVERSE SELECTION OF PPP CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 307 
Initial Considerations 308 
With reference to the data presented in Table V, the data from the survey is adequate by these 309 
tests. The data has 210 observations per variable with the value of KMO being 0.784 which is 310 
greater than 0.50. 311 
From Table V, Bartlett’s test is highly significant and hence recommended for factor 312 
analysis. This determinant of the matrix is used in testing for multicollinearity. The 313 
determinant or the R-matrix should be greater than 0.00001. Field (2005) opines that if it is 314 
less than the value, the variables that correlate very highly should not be included in the 315 
analysis. However, no two variables correlate very highly. Mild collinearity according to 316 
Field (2005) is not a problem for factor analysis and hence the data is appropriate for factor 317 
analysis. 318 
<Insert Table V here> 319 
The Guttmann-Kaiser rule and the Cattel scree test were used in determining the number of 320 
factors to be extracted. Guttmann-Kaiser rule suggests that only factors with an eigen value 321 
greater than 1 should be retained whilst the Cattel scree test suggests that all further 322 
components after the one starting the elbow should not be included. Applying these criteria 323 
on the number of principal components to be extracted suggests that eight (8) components 324 
should be extracted.   325 
<Insert Table VI here> 326 
DISCUSSION OF FACTOR ANALYSIS  327 
Component 1 (Transparent process and contract) 328 
Component one consists of the factors: Well-designed contract, Create a clear and 329 
transparent process and Harmonization of interests. From observations of the relationship 330 
among the variables loaded onto this component, it has been termed ‘Transparent process and 331 
contract’ factors. This extracted component accounted for 12.117% of the total variance. It is 332 
predictable that these have been weighed highly because the respondents must have 333 
considered these strategies as very critical in reducing the problems of moral hazard and 334 
adverse selection. 335 
Well-designed contract with eigen value of 0.896 is very important. Contract is the most vital 336 
instrument that regulates the information between the project owner and contractor (Ameyaw 337 
and Wilhelm, 2017). Therefore, a well-designed contract which defines the ways of 338 
information transfer is the most effective way to decrease the information asymmetry risk 339 
(Lobner, 2009). This agrees with past study conducted by (Owusu-Manu et al., 2018b) where 340 
well-designed contract was identified as a significant factor in curbing moral hazard and 341 
adverse selection in PPP projects. 342 
 Create a clear and transparent process had an eigen value of 0.458. Routinization and 343 
standardization will create a market for PPPs that provides the public and private sector with 344 
a clear roadmap for success. This will ultimately lead to a reduction of the agency problems 345 
of moral hazard and adverse selection (Ameyaw and Wilhelm, 2017). 346 
Harmonization of interests with eigen value of 0.896 is also another significant strategy. A 347 
main instrument for reducing the risks of moral hazard is the harmonization of interests, by 348 
profit sharing of the contractor. For the planning participants, contractual incentives must be 349 
given so that the targets of the principal are achieved (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005).  350 
Component 2 (Incentives and monitoring) 351 
Component two consists of the factors: Increased incentives to control costs and Monitoring. 352 
It has been named ‘incentives and monitoring’ factors. This extracted component accounted 353 
for 8.743% of the total variance. 354 
Increased incentives to control costs had an eigen value of 0.599. The self-selection of the 355 
most qualified construction companies merged with the incentive to manage costs as a 356 
remaining claimant curtails with moral hazard and adverse selection (Blanc-Brude, 2013).  357 
Monitoring had an eigen value of 0.676. Monitoring is essential after a contract has been 358 
signed. The intent of monitoring is to make certain that the agent is acting in harmony with 359 
the contract. This in the long term decreases the problems of information asymmetry 360 
(Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). 361 
Component 3 (Screening and technical assistance) 362 
The factors of the third component were Contract guarantees and technical assistance and 363 
Screening. This extracted component accounted for 8.185% of the total variance. It was 364 
named ‘screening and technical assistance’ factors. 365 
Contract guarantees and technical assistance had eigen value of 0.503. Overall, the 366 
responsibility of a modern development banks or current multilateral banks would involve 367 
steps at national and international stages, comprising from fiscal and risk mitigation features, 368 
including the terms of technical guidance (Blanc-Brude, 2013). 369 
Screening had eigen value of 0.637 and refers to the term for all activities whereby the 370 
principal attempts to gain more accurate information on the quality attributes of the agent 371 
which are pertinent. These include: references, work probes, certificates, and credit 372 
worthiness (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). The aim of screening is to gain useful 373 
information to the principal in an attempt to be more conversant with the qualifications of the 374 
agent (Blanc-Brude, 2013). 375 
Component 4 (Unbundling and benchmarking) 376 
Component four consists of the factors: Benchmarking and Financial unbundling. This 377 
extracted component accounted for 7.604% of the total variance. It was named ‘unbundling 378 
and benchmarking’ factors. 379 
Benchmarking had eigen value of 0.754. Asymmetries of information on the operating costs 380 
are reduced through benchmarking and market testing processes (yardstick competition). 381 
Elementary parts of the service provided by the contractor must be periodically evaluated 382 
against market prices (Bureau and Mougeot, 2007).  383 
Financial unbundling had eigen value of 0.575. Financial unbundling is an effective way of 384 
ensuring transparency in projects by inducing a disclosure of the contract financial main 385 
points (Kumar et al., 2018).  386 
Component 5 (Funding and small liabilities) 387 
The factors of the fifth component were Funding competition and Contain private liabilities 388 
to small size. This extracted component accounted for 7.388 % of the total variance. It was 389 
named ‘funding and small liabilities’ factors. 390 
Funding competition had eigen value of 0.720. At the negotiation period, funding 391 
competition helps to raise the public sector's information on the deal. However, the cost of 392 
gathering this information should not override the savings it brings about. In this instance, the 393 
size of the deal, and the number of bidders, has a crucial role in the trade-off (Singh et al., 394 
2006). This agrees with study conducted by Akintayo (2018) on minimizing risks in PPP 395 
construction projects. 396 
Contain private liabilities to small size had eigen value of 0.716. Private liabilities should be 397 
contained to an adequately small size (Blanc-Brude, 2013). As well as requiring that the firm 398 
not spend so much in the project, in spite of its assets, this necessitates that the firm not 399 
depend on debt greatly, even if it has unrestricted access to the credit market. PPP projects 400 
are to be effectively run and should not be extremely leveraged (Danau and Vinella, 2014).  401 
 402 
Component 6 (Information clarification and signaling) 403 
Component six consists of the factors: Signaling and Clarifying the need for information in 404 
the project. It has been named ‘Information clarification and signaling’ factors. This extracted 405 
component accounted for 7.263% of the total variance. 406 
Signaling had eigen value of 0.464. The market party which has more information, e.g. the 407 
contractor, signals its type to the client who is the least informed market stakeholder, using 408 
some signals. In case of signaling, the initiative goes out from the better informed market 409 
participants who send out their signals first and who only then get contracts offered by the 410 
worse informed market party (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005).  411 
Clarifying the need for information in the project had eigen value of 0.722. This agrees with a 412 
study conducted by Ameyaw and Wilhelm (2017) where need for information was identified 413 
as a risk mitigation strategy. The necessity for information which a project participant 414 
requires to accomplish his tasks within a definite period of time is explained according to 415 
quality, type and quantity (Ameyaw and Wilhelm, 2017).  416 
Component 7 (Risk and contract management) 417 
Component seven consists of the factors: Managing of construction risks and Securing 418 
contract enforcement. It has been named ‘Risk and contract management’ factors. This 419 
extracted component accounted for 7.211% of the total variance. 420 
Managing of construction risks had eigen value of 0.721. In financing of projects, not 421 
excluding Public-Private-Partnerships, construction risks are controlled by way of a network 422 
of contracts (Blanc-Brude, 2008) and transferred to construction companies which efficiently 423 
make available insurance against unanticipated construction costs to the financiers and 424 
sponsors of the Special Purpose Entity (SPE). 425 
Securing contract enforcement had eigen value of 0.681. To be able to induce the firm to 426 
fulfill the contract, there should be the requirement of investing a satisfactorily worthy 427 
quantity of money in advance, and it should be allowed to recuperate that investment by the 428 
passage of time at the execution stage (Blanc-Brude, 2013). To be brought on to partake in 429 
the partnerships, private firms should be wealthy to start with. This would discourage the 430 
speculative and probable unpredictable investors (Danau and Vinella, 2014). 431 
Component 8 (Cooperation and finance) 432 
The eighth and last component had the following factors: Bond spread; External finance; 433 
Cooperation among project participants and Information disclosure. It has been named 434 
‘Cooperation and finance’ factors. This extracted component accounted for 6.917% of the 435 
total variance. 436 
Bond spread had eigen value of 0.583. An inadequate risk transfer to the contractor is 437 
discovered by the reasonability of the bond spread. For instance, if the public partner takes on 438 
almost all the demand risk, it is expressed in financial expressions, like providing to the 439 
contractor an advance contract for free (Välilä, 2005).  440 
External finance had eigen value of 0.600. Dewatripont and Legros (2005) distinguish two 441 
types of external financiers, outside shareholders and debt creditors. They consider that the 442 
financial structure of the contract is not without significance on the private partner incentives. 443 
Commercial finance literature reiterates that outside debt or equity might lower incentives to 444 
exert effort for the contractor (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  445 
Cooperation among project participants had eigen value of 0.755. In connection with moral 446 
hazard, the frequency of the cooperation of the project participants is of major importance 447 
(Owusu-Manu et al., 2018a). If the contractual partners repeatedly cooperate with one 448 
another, this leads to a reduction of information asymmetries. The mutual trust resulting from 449 
long-term cooperation will cause a reduction of risk costs (Lobner, 2009).  450 
Information disclosure had eigen value of 0.552. The agent delivers information to the client 451 
using some special files for client’s reference. The client will esteem the agent’s reputation as 452 
a significant evaluation index when he selects agent, which is because the project 453 
implementation needs the agent’s strength, experience, credibility, moral qualities among 454 
others, and these all constitute private information of the agent (Gatti, 2013). 455 
 456 
CONCLUSIONS 457 
Summary of findings 458 
From the mean score ranking, Monitoring; Transfer of risks; Screening; Managing of 459 
construction risks; and Increased incentives to control costs were the most significant 460 
strategies to reduce the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in PPP construction 461 
projects. 462 
After the factor analysis using Principal Component Analysis, the eight components were: 463 
Transparent process and contract; Incentives and monitoring; Screening and technical 464 
assistance; Unbundling and benchmarking; Funding and small liabilities; Information 465 
clarification and signalling; Risk and contract management; and Cooperation and finance 466 
factors. 467 
Empirically, the robust and rigorous identification of MHAS strategies in the current study 468 
have useful theoretical, practical and wider implications. Overall, the study makes a unique 469 
contribution to the MHAS and PPP body of knowledge through benchmarking the most 470 
significant strategies that can be used to reduce PPP project failures arising from MHAS. 471 
Theoretically, the research constitutes the first exclusive assessment of the generic, 472 
significant strategies in Ghanaian PPP projects. From a theoretical lens, the output of the 473 
research contributes to the checklist of strategies that reduce PPP project failures arising from 474 
MHAS and may contribute to the development of the agency theory. Additionally, the 475 
outcome of the research provides a sound basis for future research on MHAS in PPP projects 476 
in any country. This is of relevance to academic, industry and PPP policy researchers. 477 
Practically, the identified and prioritized strategies will serve as a guide and managerial 478 
support in future PPP projects. Although no case studies were used to validate the findings, 479 
the outcome draws on wealth of experiences and lessons and thus, may reflect the realities of 480 
PPP project failures. As such, the findings of the research may guide construction 481 
stakeholders in reducing failure of PPP projects due to MHAS. These stakeholders and 482 
practitioners may improve project success by recognizing and planning against failure of 483 
these PPP projects. 484 
A limitation in this study is the fact that the research applies mainly to the Ghanaian and 485 
makes the generalisation limited to the study environment due to the peculiar nature of PPP 486 
projects in different jurisdictions. 487 
Since the current findings have not been validated, future studies should adopt interviews and 488 
desk reviews to help in triangulation and validation of the strategies of MHAS. This will also 489 
expand the relevance of the findings to other national and industry settings. 490 
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